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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Security Sector Review is a necessary process in view of the changes in the external 
environment and internal developments in Kosovo. The development of the security sector 
in Kosovo has been underway since the post-conflict period and most notably in the 
aftermath of the declaration of independence. The evolving political situation which affects 
the national strategic goals as well as constraints in resources and the evolving threats 
necessitates a comprehensive security review.  This exercise should highlight the main 
orientations of security priorities as well as carry some implications for the institutional set-
up and resources dedicated to the priorities therein.  
The past decade has experienced new developments in the political, economic and 
technological sphere. This has changed the perception of threats of the major international 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the region of Western Balkans is gradually transforming 
from a source of threat and tension towards active participants in shaping Europe’s security. 
All Western Balkans countries have signed contractual relations with the European Union 
(EU), while a number have recently joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
While challenges to stability still linger in the region, it should be noted that nearly all 
countries are on a path of reforms and have actively taken part in contributing to stability 
and peace.  
The sources of external threats have increasingly become unpredictable. The more 
traditional and conventional sources of military threats have given way to new asymmetric 
threats coming from non-state actors. As the region has stabilised from conflicts, other 
conflicts in the neighbouring regions produce a diverse set of threats to national security 
namely immigration, international terrorism, threats of biological and chemical weapons, 
and narcotics. The changes in the surrounding and global environment necessities a 
comprehensive review of Kosovo’s security structure so as to adopt to its strategic foreign 
policy goals of Euro-Atlantic integrations. The security structures should balance their local 
responsibilities with those of gradually increasing contributions to regional and global 
peace. The process of security sector review should hereto aim to produce a security 
structure that is well trained, inter-operable and ready to respond to immediate threats.  
The purpose of this policy brief is to outline some key features that need to be addressed in 
the security sector review, highlight three scenarios for the future modelling of the Kosovo 
Security Force to respond to both local and international priorities and determine the 
competencies, responsibilities and resources needed to accomplish the strategic national 
goals. The process is dictated in part by the political constraints resulting from the NATO 
involvement in Kosovo and complexities arising from unresolved political issues with 
Serbia. Nevertheless, the aforementioned constraints do not prevent Kosovo from adopting 
itself and its security structures to meet the contemporary demands and requirements that 
emanate from its stated ambitions for NATO and EU membership.  
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The purpose of the policy paper is to outline the threats, interests and potential courses of 
action in structuring the Kosovo Security Force.  The process of security sector review is a 
complex process involving more institutions and study areas. However, this research limits 
itself to the defence and military component only.   The study is an attempt to highlight 
some approaches in the exercise of the security sector review.  It represents a first step from 
a non-governmental perspective and is aimed at generating a more comprehensive debate 
on the issue.  In addition to mapping out contemporary threats, challenges and risks, the 
paper also highlights programmatic approaches and milestones that Kosovo has to fulfilling 
in achieving its strategic security objectives. Finally, it proposes and elaborates three 
potential scenarios for the future of Kosovo Security Force.  
When the issue is whether to adopt a particular option at all, most policy analyses are 
comparative; they compare and contrast a menu of options, searching for the best candidate. 
An analysis might assess the performance of an existing policy, examine a single new 
candidate to replace it, and compare the results. Or it might compare and contrast a bigger 
set of alternative options, perhaps three, five, or even more. It can examine how these 
options achieve a single goal, or how they achieve several goals. It might focus on multiple 
goals, develop a separate policy for each of them, and assess how these separate policies 
could be blended together to make a coherent whole. It might then assess how to coordinate 
and synchronize the execution of these policies. 
This policy analysis adopts a blend of methodology that should enable the the readers to 
both explain the strategic political side [the big picture] but also the metrics to assess the 
economic implications of each policy option. Strategic evaluation methods are typically used 
for big-picture subjects. Often employed by political scientists, these methods, although 
rigorous, tend to be verbal and qualitative rather than quantitative. They are aimed at 
making broad-gauged judgments rather than fine-grained assessments. However, to 
complement the limitations and reinforce the information behind each argument the paper 
should also uses system analysis They make frequent use of graphical curves and related 
calculations to help focus on the cost-effectiveness of trade-offs among different policies and 
programs, especially those that consume large quantities of resources, such as weapons 
systems. They aspire to get the numbers for costs and effectiveness basically right, but not 
to an extreme degree of precision.   
Overall, the paper should proceed with a strategic evaluation first in order to generate and 
compare alternative policy options.  This level of analysis has assisted the research team in 
carry out a threat-mapping exercise and highlight Kosovo’s strategic interests and goals.  
Assessments of policy-options and composite plans evaluations relied on systems analysis 
methods. Some of the information needed to feed strategic evaluation was accessed through 
desk-research and interviews with stakeholders.   System analysis methods and scenario 
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cost-effectiveness relied on assumptions and statistical information from international 
organisations and first-hand data processing of Government accounts.  
The study was developed and implemented by Kosovar Centre for Security Studies on the 
basis of generic methodological approaches in policy analysis of defence reviews.  We must 
acknowledge that there were several limitations in the research process.  Firstly, despite the 
generous support from KFOS Foundation a study of this sort needs more resources. 
Secondly, statistical assessments often rely on secondary data, some data were missing or 
that different states used different categories of data.  Thirdly, the research team would have 
preferred more recent data and more time to process them.  Finally, the research team 
would have preferred more time and resources for stakeholder consultation and interviews.   
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3. KOSOVO SECURITY SECTOR IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
The contemporary strategic environment for the Kosovo security sector has become fairly 
complex with increased volatility in the socio-economic domain, challenges for living 
environment, technological developments and a complex political environment in the post-
independence period.  Nowadays Kosovo enjoys a relative security.  Despite the bitter 
experience during the conflict and political disputes with Serbia over its status, few perceive 
any imminent external military threat (Kosovo Security Barometer, 2013). Like other 
countries in the region, Kosovo may be exposed to asymmetric, non-conventional security 
risks and threats. As a new country it is small in size and has limited resources and has 
heavily relied on the presence of NATO troops to offset potential short-term challenges. 
Recent agreements with Serbia on normalising the relations have paved the way for an 
increased regional cooperation and participation in collective security mechanisms.  
Kosovo has fairly recently come out of a conflict with Serbia. It declared its independence in 
2008 and despite some minor inter-ethnic frictions; it has ever since enjoyed a period of 
relative stability.  Relations with Serbia have remained tense but stable.  Disagreement over 
its status and Serbia’s objections has often left Kosovo outside of the remit of regional 
cooperation initiatives.  However, both Serbia and Kosovo are on institutionalized path of 
EU integration and that should contribute to easing the remaining disputes between the 
two.  Just as many other regional countries, Kosovo still faces challenges of weak institutions 
and rule of law.  The institutions of the Republic of Kosovo have faced challenges in 
extending their authority in the northern part due to Kosovo Serbs’ refusal to recognise the 
institutions that resulted from the Ahtisaari Plan.  
Among the most obvious forms of external threat to the national security of Kosovo are 
international organized crime, illegal migration, international terrorism and the potential 
spread of weapons of mass destruction.  On the other hand, it is also challenged by other 
indirect but unpredictable sources of threats emanating from the political developments in 
Western Balkans,  the impact of economic crisis and low levels of socio-economic 
development, environmental challenges and threats stemming from globalisation and 
technological developments.  Majority of threats, risks and challenges that it faces are 
regional and transnational in nature and as a result international cooperation and 
participation in collective regional and international mechanisms is essential.  
3.1 Military environment 
The significance of the military environment has changed since the end of the Cold War and 
conflict in former Yugoslavia.  The presence of NATO forces in Kosovo has offset the 
concerns of any potential external military attack in the post-conflict period.  Kosovo is not 
under any imminent military threat.  While political disputes and rivalries in Western 
Balkans persist, all national armies are on a process of reform and downsizing.  Croatia and 
Albania have become NATO members while Macedonia remained out of the last 
membership bid due to objections from Greece.  Serbia has adopted a neutral military policy 
refusing to seek membership in NATO.  With international troops present in the region and 
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states having firmly committed to the path of EU integration few would expect any resort to 
military means in solving disputes in Western Balkans.  Direct military attacks towards 
Kosovo remain distant though not impossible.  
In the future, basic sources of security threats will emanate from politically destabilised 
areas [e.g. Middle East], terrorist organisations, international organized crime groups and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Armed and defence forces will have to 
reorient their strategies and means to tackle these sources of threats.  Kosovo along with 
countries in the region are small and lack resources to tackle global threats and this 
necessitates their participation in combined and international operations.  The 
unpredictability and scope of threats require that nations aim to build multipurpose 
security forces that are able to adapt and react quickly to global dynamics.  
The security forces would have to be combat ready for rapid reactions to potential crisis and 
be prepared for quick deployment. The security forces should also be able to react to a 
diverse nature of threats including those related to territorial integrity, ability to respond to 
international crisis and peace-building operations and responsiveness to natural and 
emergency situations.  The changes in the strategic environment also dictate the type of 
exercises, partnerships, development of concepts and doctrines and the purchase of 
equipment.  Unconventional asymmetric warfare and system-against-system warfare are 
taking the place of conventional forces –against-forces warfare.  
 
3.2 Political environment 
Despite the consolidation of the security situation, the region and Kosovo as part of it will 
continue to need initiatives that contain and prevent political tensions in the future.  Serbia, 
along with a large number of international actors, continues to challenge the legality of 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  The Belgrade authorities have refrained from direct 
interference but have continued to obstruct the strengthening and expansion of authority of 
Kosovo institutions in general and those of security in particular.  To-date Serbia continues 
to finance and operate parallel administrative and security institutions in Serb-dominated 
areas in Kosovo.   
International community has often intervened to contain these tensions from out bursting 
into open hostilities.  Serbian residents in northern Kosovo responded with angry 
demonstrations and road blockages to Kosovo Governments attempts to seal the northern 
border-crossing from untaxed goods coming from Serbia. However, political disputes have 
calmed recently with the mediation of international community. Belgrade and Prishtina 
signed an agreement in April 2013 on the normalisation of relations under the auspices of 
the European Union – it stipulates the dismantling of Serbia structures in the north in 
exchange for a greater degree of autonomy for northern Serb-inhabited municipalities.  
Tense relations with Serbia remain a challenge but not a direct threat.  
The integration of Western Balkans and Kosovo in the European political, economic and 
security institutions will lessen the potential for political instability and encourage regional 
cooperation.  The European Union membership will especially serve as a catalyst to 
neutralise the sources of political tensions in Serbia and Kosovo.  It should also lead to a 
relaxation of Serbia’s obstructions to Kosovo’s incorporation in regional political, economic 
and security mechanisms.  Mending relations with Serbia is important as a mean to remove 
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the opposition of non-recognizing EU members towards Kosovo’s signing of the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement with the European Commission. Another organisation of 
particular importance as far as political stability is concerned is NATO.  It has played an 
active role in Kosovo through KFOR since the post-conflict period. Kosovo has benefited 
from the security contribution of the NATO members states but has not entered into a 
formal cooperation modality with the Alliance.  The former has found it difficult to maintain 
the consensus of all member states since the declaration of Kosovo independence.  
 
3.3 Socio-economic environment  
The socio-economic environment directly affects and shapes the political and security 
processes and hence is an essential element of security.  Economies are becoming 
increasingly connected and inter-dependent and more sensitive to global economic trends.  
Kosovo faces serious unemployment and poverty problems.  Poverty rates are highest in 
Europe. The country is landlocked and its economy has suffered from a long period of 
neglect and under-investment.  The economy has been growing steadily in recent years but 
that has not done much to offset the social pressure.  Kosovo’s demographic structure is 
dominated by young people – majority of whom are unemployed.  Growth rates and private 
sector development was too slow to accommodate the demands for jobs.  The economy and 
welfare still rely heavily on remittances and international aid.   
The recent economic and debt crisis in Europe has negatively affected the Western Balkans 
countries – growth rates nearly stalled (IMF, 2011).  The negative consequences of the crisis 
have also affected people incomes and welfare. Government spending on social security and 
welfare state have decreased since 2008 (Barttlet, 2009).  Life satisfaction levels have 
dropped significantly as well as people’s trust in institutions (Balkan Monitor, 2010).   These 
consequences attest to the region’s interconnectedness and the spill over effect of external 
risks which could challenge the stability.  Kosovo Security Barometer survey (2013) found 
that Kosovans perceive the economic situation as the paramount challenge face Kosovo and 
its security.  
Kosovo’s membership in the Central Europe Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the 
prospect of EU membership will certainly have positive effects on its socio-economic 
development.  Regional political and economic cooperation in an attempt to minimise the 
perceived regional political risks should also be helpful in encouraging foreign direct 
investment and capital exchange. However, the opening of Kosovo’s economy to global trade 
and competitiveness will also lead to increased volatility to developments in the global 
economy.  External asymmetric shocks should become much more common once Kosovo’s 
economy and business cycle has been fully integrated into regional and European markets. 
Forces of global competition will necessarily cause tensions in the society as it adjusts to 
more competition. Kosovo needs to formulate a social security to provide a safety net and 
insurance against economic re-adjustments in the future.  
 
3.4 Other challenges  
Kosovo has in recent years faced few instances of natural disasters as flooding, avalanches, 
landslides and earthquakes. In addition, industrial and chemical waste from Trepca Complex 
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and Obilic Power Plants continue to be pose risks to the overall population.  Both sources of 
natural and man-made hazards still loom in the Kosovo society. In addition, Kosovo has to 
account for the technological advancement over the last decades and the challenges that it 
creates for its security.  Incursions into information systems, blocking of entire systems, 
unauthorized access and the potential dissemination of inaccurate information are new 
forms of threats made possible by the use of information technology.  
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4. KOSOVO INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC GOALS  
 
The national security policy is a balanced set of activities and programmes comprising 
foreign, defence, economic, social and cultural policies. The most important goal of Kosovo 
national security policy deriving from the strategic interests and values is to ensure the 
security of Kosovo and its people and to strengthen regional and global peace, security and 
stability.  Kosovo has declared its independence in 2008 and its institutions are still in the 
development phase. However, it has firmly committed itself to pursuing integration in the 
European Union, NATO and UN.  The Government has since stated its objective of 
consolidating Kosovo’s standing in international relations; pursue good neighbourly 
relations and active cooperation in South-East Europe political and economic organisations.  
Kosovo is a small country in global security terms and has limited resources. It is still in the 
process of consolidating its democracy and institutions.  It declared its independence from 
Serbia in 2008 after decade of United Nations Administration.  Majority of EU and NATO 
countries have recognised its independence but there are still members that have failed to 
endorse the act.  Roughly half of the members of United Nations have so far recognised it as 
sovereign country.  The failure to win recognition from a number of key states has made 
Kosovo’s participation and relations with EU and NATO quite complex.  It is the only country 
in the region that does not have a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.  
While it has profited from a heavy NATO presence, it still does not have a clear path of 
cooperation and participation in NATO structures.  Serbia continues to claim Kosovo as part 
of its territory. Their refusals to accept Kosovo as a sovereign nation have posed a number 
of internal challenges and difficulties in participating in regional political and economic 
initiatives.  
Nevertheless, the European Union mediated dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina has 
produced a number of results in improving their relations and a relaxation of Serbia’s 
objections towards Kosovo’s participation in regional institutions.  That culminated with 
Brussels Agreement (2013) on normalising relations.  Kosovo government officials have 
hailed the agreement as a good step towards consolidating Kosovo’s statehood and a step 
towards the opening of the European integration perspective. The text of the agreement, 
among others, stated that neither Kosovo nor Serbia should obstruct each-others’ path 
towards European integrations. This could create a conducive environment for constructive 
cooperation with neighbours and strengthening regional relations based on trust and 
cooperation as a way to ensure Kosovo’s long-term security.  
In pursuing its national security policy and strategic goal, Kosovo has to reach a number of 
objectives and milestones namely (a) build good neighbourly relations, (b) actively 
participate in regional cooperation mechanisms, (c) sign a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the EU, (d) participate in the NATO Partnership for Peace program as a first 
step towards full membership, (e) seek membership and cooperation in the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and (f) seek membership in United Nations and 
other international organisations.  In essence Kosovo has to follow a defence policy centred 
on the priorities of multinational integration and cooperation, participation in international 
peace-building operations, continue the consolidation of Kosovo Security Force into a 
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structure capable of contributing to security goals and finally increase its resources for 
defence.  
 
4.1 Multinational integration and cooperation  
European Integration and participation in the future European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) should guide the national security policy.  Kosovo along with other Western Balkans 
states has been offered the European integration perspective at the Thessaloniki Summit 
(2003).  Formalisation of its relations with the EU has proven difficult due to internal 
disagreements within the union – five members maintain a policy of non-recognition of 
Kosovo’s statehood.  Kosovo hosts a large EU rule of law mission and receives significant 
assistance as part of Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA).  Cooperation with the EU 
instruments and programmes has advanced over the course of the past years but has been 
complicated process due to EU policy on status neutrality.   
Both the government and political elites are staunch supporters of EU integration as a 
national strategic goal. The vast majority of the population is firmly supportive of the 
integration process (Kosovo Security Barometer, 2013).  Kosovo has been offered the Visa 
Liberalisation Process by the European Commission in 2012 and it presents an important 
mechanism for dialogue on important security concerns. In addition it serves as an 
important catalyst for the Europeanization of the security practices. However, the 
Government still awaits the green light from the Commission on the Mechanism for 
Stabilisation and Association – a process that should officialise and streamline the dialogue 
with the EU and provide further incentives for reforms for the fulfilment of the Copenhagen 
Criteria.  Kosovo’s European integration perspective is an important development for 
regional cooperation and stability in Western Balkans.  
NATO has actively participated in the establishment of the Kosovo security apparatus in the 
post-conflict period. Its KFOR force is responsible for the security of Kosovo.  Despite the 
high level of NATO’s direct involvement in Kosovo for more than a decade and irrespective 
of the fact that all Kosovo’s neighbouring countries have already signed Partnership for 
Peace (PFP) programs with NATO, Kosovo is the only country outside of the accession talks. 
Kosovo was still in the process of capacity building and as such could not assert its 
candidacy to join Euro-Atlantic accession agreements. Hence this can be seen as the reason 
why Kosovo institutions did not officially apply to NATO to start the process of eventually 
signing the PfP.  While the non-recognizing NATO members have been pragmatic enough to 
enable the assistance and training of the Kosovo Security Force, it should be noted that 
contractual relations between Kosovo and NATO will challenged by internal opposition 
within the Alliance.  
These delays were not only attributed to political constraints, but also to the internal 
security transition which has been occurring over the last four years. However, considering 
that now the Kosovo security sector has entered its final stage of strategic review, the 
expression of interest for Euro-Atlantic integration is finally getting a higher priority on the 
institutional agenda.  The vast majority of Kosovans consider NATO membership as a good 
thing for Kosovo and are of the opinion that it along with EU integration solves their security 
dilemmas (Kosovo Security Barometer, 2013).  
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Kosovo is not a United Nations member – two UN Security Council members oppose its 
independence and membership.  UN membership is an important security policy milestone 
for Kosovo. It is both a mechanism to increase cooperation on pressing security challenges 
and for participation in international conflict-prevention and peace-keeping operations. 
Kosovo security structures should aim in the long-term to sign a memorandum of 
cooperation with the Multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade. 
In view of its existing complexities for membership in multilateral organisations, Kosovo 
should seek active participation in regional Western Balkans and South-East Europe 
political and security initiatives.  
 
4.2 Participation in international operations 
The Kosovo Security Force was in the consolidating phase ever since the declaration of 
independence in 2008.  The establishment of the force, standard operations procedures and 
its mandate were under international military presence supervision and authority.  The 
Government of Kosovo is in the process of seeking the final approval of operation capacities 
(FOC) by NATO Council.  The confirmation of FOC has been delayed due to the internal 
security sector review process and hesitations by a number of NATO members (ELIAMEP, 
2013).   
In spite of operational challenges and political complexities, the Kosovo Security Force has 
expressed its willingness to contribute to the international peace and security.  The 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo states that that ‘KSF…may send its members abroad in 
full conformity with its international responsibilities’ (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 
2008).  The Assembly of Kosovo recently adopted the Law on Overseas Deployment of the 
Kosovo Security Force to regulate its participation in peace support operations, 
humanitarian operations and trainings.  KSF participation in international missions has 
suffered for both operational and political reasons. However, it successfully carried out a 
limited humanitarian search and rescue operation to assist Albania in managing a flooding 
disaster in 2011. The force participation in international missions should be done through 
bilateral agreements with host countries rather than through multilateral agreements in 
view of the existing political challenges.  
 
4.3 Defence capabilities  
The mandate of the militaries to perform tasks in the framework of the territorial integrity 
is a conventional task and thus applicable to all sovereign states. This mandate implies the 
primary tasks of all military forces in the world to make necessary investments to defend 
the country in case of military attacks or any other external non-conventional attacks to the 
wellbeing of the country and its citizens. While decrease of the military threats in Europe 
(and in the Western Balkans) weakened the arguments for investing in this domain 
however, none of the European military forces refrained entirely or withdrew from 
exercising further this mandate. The mandate to some extent is becoming symbolic but it is 
an essential pillar of the contemporary defence sector.  
In Kosovo, the international military presence (KFOR) is the only authority exercising this 
mandate since the post-conflict period. The foundations of the mandate are based on the UN 
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SC Resolution 1244 as well as the Military-Technical Agreement (Kumanovo Agreement). 
However and, in particular, since the declaration of the independence of Kosovo there were 
significant changes in the structure and performance of KFOR on the ground. Troops 
decreased drastically with an improved security situation; the responsibilities for the 
border control with Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia were transferred to the Kosovo 
Police while the geographical scope of the performance of KFOR was predominantly limited 
to the northern part of Kosovo.  
Kosovar security institutions, particularly the KSF,  did not exercise any component falling 
within the scope of defending territorial integrity. The existing legislation does not provide 
an explicit mandate for the KSF to perform tasks in ensuring territorial integrity. However, 
the Constitutional provisions are broad enough to allow for creative interpretations.. The 
Article 125 makes it explicit that "the Republic of Kosovo has authority over law enforcement, 
security...and boarder control within its territory". While there is no direct reference to 
defence structure or defence policies, the Constitutional provisions recognise the authority 
of the President of Kosovo in declaring the state of emergency. In sum, the existing 
legislation does not explicitly regulate the mandate of KSF for ensuring territorial integrity 
in Kosovo but on the other hand there are no legal provisions prohibiting it.  
The exercise of disaster relief and civil protection tasks is an essential mandate of the 
existing KSF. The institution's focus was solely in increasing the capacities of civil 
protection. The civil protection mandate of the KSF is clearly regulated in the Law on KSF. It 
is mandated to assist civil authorities in responding to natural and man-made hazards and 
emergencies, including as part of regional or international crisis response to conduct 
explosive ordinance disposal and to assist civil authorities through civil protection 
operations.     Prospective defence force with consolidated civil protection capabilities may 
serve also the regional and international efforts for crisis management. While Kosovo seek 
NATO membership, it is also required to adhere to the "smart defence" concept which 
requires from each member to provide their most expertise. KSF can offer either one of the 
following specializations: civil protection (especially urban rescue tasks) or explosive 
ordinance disposal (including demining) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16  
 
 
5. KOSOVO DEFENCE POLICY OPTIONS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS 
FOR KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE 
 
 
The context of security sector development in Kosovo differed to other Western Balkans 
countries. The institutions were predominantly build from scratch through the support of 
the international community. There was no institutional correlation between former 
Yugoslav security structures and post-conflict security institutions in Kosovo.  There are 
three phases of the security sector development: first phase (1999-2005) marked the 
establishment of the first Kosovo security institutions, notably the Kosovo Police and civil 
emergency structures; second phase (2005-2008) highlighted the initial handover of the 
responsibilities from the international community to the Kosovo Government (this period 
also reflected the establishment of civilian and oversight structures); third phase (2008-
2013) embedded a new security sector architecture in light of Kosovo’s statehood. The third 
phase reflected a completed security sector while new security institutions where 
established: namely the Kosovo Security Force and Kosovo Intelligence Agency.  In all of the 
three phases, the predominant argument for the development of the security sector relied 
on the UN SC Resolution 1244 and the suggestions provided by international actors. Those 
arguments reflected upon the political stability argument.  
The key feature of all three phase of security sector development in Kosovo is that policy 
choices were based on a top-down approach with little say from local actors or adequate 
consideration for the nature and scope of threat that Kosovo faced.  Decisions regarding the 
structure and institutional set-up of the sector were carefully implemented so as to balance 
local demands with regional and international political concerns.  However,  nearly fourteen 
years after the conflict and five years after the declaration of Kosovo independence provide 
an optimal and more conducive momentum for a security sector review that is anchors the 
bottom-up approach. It is essential that the principle of local ownership prevails.  The on-
going Kosovo security sector review provides a good opportunity to craft a national security 
policy and structure that is rational and designed to meet the expectations of fledgling 
democracy.  The scope of reforms and analysis of the security sector is wide. The paper is 
primarily concerned only on the future of Kosovo Security Force.  
The preceding sections highlighted the main threats and Kosovo interests and values. This 
section in turn presents a list of scenarios structured along a number of criteria of analysis. 
Each option should provide a clear sense of scope and purpose and a basis for determining 
how its instruments are to perform functional activities that create consequences that 
achieve the goal being pursued. The number of options examined is dictated by the situation 
on the ground. Sometimes the policy options to be studied are dictated by policymakers; 
other times, the analyst determines them.   The following policy options were developed in a 
consultative process by the research team. All attempts were made to present options that 
reflect the dynamics and choices that augment significant local and international 
stakeholders’ stances over the issue.  
The next step in crafting a conceptual framework is to develop subject areas for guiding the 
analysis. These subject areas help pose the critical questions to be asked and define the 
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types of information and judgments needed to evaluate the options. Their purpose is to tell 
policymakers and other readers what they need to know about the options. They focus on 
such critical issues as the nature of the policy options, their performance characteristics, 
whether they are likely to succeed or fail, the broader considerations that influence 
evaluation of them, and their overall merits.  
 
5.1 Scenarios overview 
Scenario 1 - The first scenario represents the status-quo. Under this policy options KSF is 
mandated to carry our civil protection tasks and contribute in international humanitarian 
operations.  Its legal status is that of a civil protection force that operates as a means to 
complement KFOR security responsibilities.  The force would continue to be lightly armed 
and constrained in the type of equipment that it can operate.  It will instead specialise in 
urban search and rescue operations.  The size and numbers of active and reserve component 
of the force would remain intact – 2500 active members and 800 in the reserve component. 
Its external relations and partnerships will be strictly monitored by KFOR. Under this 
scenario contractual relations and potential NATO membership is excluded in the 
foreseeable future.  The  
Scenario 2 - Under the second scenario the existing Kosovo Security Force would transform 
into a Kosovo Defence Force (KDF). The future force’s mandate is to ensure Kosovo’s 
territorial integrity, security, provide civil protection assistance and contribute to 
international peace.  The numbers of active members will be increased to 3,500 in view of 
additional tasks and responsibilities.  It will work alongside KFOR in ensuring Kosovo’s 
stability and would gradually assume new security responsibilities.  The operational budget 
of the force should be increased to 1.1% of GDP (current growth estimates and exchange 
rate).  KDF would be an equal regional partner and a potential candidate for NATO 
membership.  
Scenario 3 – Under this scenario the KSF would transform into Kosovo Army. The mandate 
of the future army will be to ensure Kosovo’s territorial integrity and contribute to civil 
protection and international peace and stability. The numbers of active members will be 
increased to 5,000 in view of additional tasks and responsibilities.  It will take the primary 
responsibility to ensure Kosovo’s stability.  The operational budget of the force should be 
increased to 1.6% of GDP (current growth estimates and exchange rate).  The Kosovo Army 
would be an equal regional partner and a potential candidate for NATO membership. 
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  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Name 
Kosovo Security 
Force  
Kosovo Defence 
Force 
Kosovo Army  
Mandate 
Civil protection taks  
and contribute to 
international 
humanitarian 
operations 
Ensuring Kosovo 
territorial integrity, 
civil protection and 
contributing to 
international peace 
Ensuring Kosovo 
territorial integrity, 
civil protection and 
contributing to 
international peace 
Size 2,500 3,500 5,000+ 
Policies Security Policies Defence and Security Defence and Security 
Relations with 
KFOR 
Operational cell Partner Partner 
NATO membership No YES YES 
Equipment Lightly armed 
No limits - 
determined by 
threats and 
resources 
No limits - determined 
by threats and 
resources 
Budget (% GDP) 0.70% 1.10% 1.60% 
SMART Defence Urban Rescue Search and Rescue 
Search and Rescue 
+Demining 
Institutional 
Structure 
Integrated Ministry 
of KSF 
Integrated Ministry 
of Defence 
Ministry of Defence 
seperated from HQ 
 
 
5.2 Scenarios Analysis: actors preferences and political implications 
 
This section will list the visions and ambitions of actors and stakeholders.  The exercise will 
list actors [both international and local] behind every scenario.  The research team has used 
both official statements and discourse analysis in placing actors’ preferences for the three 
potential Scenarios. It should be noted that many of the actors have refrained from making 
an explicit stance and it is difficult to precisely know their motivations.   
There has been an intensive debate about the future of the Kosovo Security Force after the 
end of international supervision of Kosovo independence.  The second half of 2013 marks 
the end of the provisional legal constraints on the mandate and numbers of the Kosovo 
Security Force.  Along the same view, the Government of Kosovo has launched the Strategic 
Security Sector Review process to determine the outcome after the initial operationalization 
of the Kosovo Security Force.  According to Governments’ assessments’, Kosovo Security 
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Force transformation is yet another milestone the state-building process.  The completion of 
ISG mission in Kosovo and the end of Ahtisaari’s Plan provisional limitations point to a 
natural development for Kosovo to assume responsibilities for its own security and defence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
Scenario 1 [Blue] – Actors’ preferences 
Scenario 2[Green]-  Actors preferences 
Scenario 3 [Red] – Actors’ preferences 
 
NATO on the other hand has recognised the progress that KSF has made since its 
establishment but has stopped short of issuing an assessment over whether KSF has 
reached the Full Operational Capability (FOC).  Kosovo will abstain from a unilateral 
declaration of a national army, and the KSF will maintain its current status and mandate 
even after June 2013. The operational capabilities of the KSF will remain under the 
oversight of KFOR, and under no circumstances will they exceed the agreed upon limitations 
that currently stand under Kosovo’s Law on the KSF. In return, NATO appears willing to 
issue a public declaration, which will certify that the KSF has reached its Full Operational 
Capabilities (FOC) and will be ready in the future to assume more responsibility in providing 
security in Kosovo (ELIAMEP, 2013).  
The existing Scenario 1 would see Kosovo Security Force concentrate on its existing 
mandate of providing emergency assistance to law enforcement agencies in the event of 
natural disasters of man-made hazards.  In addition the force would be available for limited 
regional and international missions agreed upon on bilateral basis and with the permission 
of international military presence in Kosovo.  The civil protection force would be an 
operational local cell to assist NATO forces in providing security to Kosovo.  The existing 
scenario would be most probably an option favoured by international military presence in 
view of difficulties to come up with a consensual vision on KSF.  In addition, the status quo 
would presumably approximate the stance of a number of regional and existing NATO 
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members who oppose any further militarisation of KSF.  A potential review of KSF mandate 
would happen at a later stage once the non-recognising members have come to terms with it 
or in the event that Kosovo becomes a member of the United Nations.  Until then Kosovo 
would be discouraged from seeking NATO membership.  
However, the existing scenario would be consistently challenged by the local political 
establishment.  A growing domestic pressure would likely compel the ruling establishment 
to push for unilateral actions and legal amendments.  Kosovo political elites would consider 
this as a natural step and reward after the completion of the mandate of the International 
Steering Group for Kosovo (ISG). It would require significant international pressure to 
maintain the local actors’ current course of action.  Unilateral actions towards changing the 
mandate and institutional structure of KSF would probably cause tensions between Kosovo 
and a number of existing NATO members and potentially sever Kosovo’s chances for future 
NATO membership given the unanimity rule.  Such actions will predictably cause an outcry 
in Serbia and would further complicate Governments’ relations with Serb-inhabited 
municipalities in the north.   They could also hamper efforts to implement the Brussels 
agreement (2013) and make local Serbs more reluctant to integrate in the structure.  
Under the Scenario 2, Kosovo Security Force would transform into a Kosovo Defence Force 
(KDF) after the NATO’s certification that KSF has reached the Full Operational Capabilities 
(FOC).  In addition to the existing mandate, the future KDF would assume further 
responsibilities and be mandated to protect the territorial integrity and security of Kosovo.  
KDF would partner KFOR in exercising security responsibilities and would enable a gradual 
and phased hand-over of responsibilities in different geographical regions.  In addition to 
extended internal responsibilities, the KDF would have no legal constraints in entering into 
regional cooperation mechanisms.  Both political and legal constraints looming over KSF 
mandate, equipment and international partnerships would be removed.  KDF just like the 
case with the Bosnian Army would be on a two level relationship with the Alliance – both as 
a partner in maintain security and stability but also as a perspective candidate for PFP and 
full membership.  
This Scenario would please the local 
political establishment and would 
ease the opposition’s pressure for 
unilateral actions.  The Kosovo 
Assembly would amend the existing 
Law on KSF through a qualified 
majority vote.  In order to allay 
neighbours’ concerns, the law would 
also enshrine a clause specifying the 
defensive nature of the force.  This 
scenario would cause a temporary 
uproar among a number of NATO 
members.  However, this would be an 
outcome closet to a natural 
equilibrium accounting for both local 
demands and international concerns 
and a creative balance of actors’ positions.   Non-recognising NATO members could choose 
to maintain the unity of the Alliance by keeping their relations with the force intact while 
refraining from providing direct assistance in implementing the extended legal mandate.  
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Under the constellation of the Scenario 2 the KDF would enter into bilateral agreements 
with NATO members to develop its capacities in implementing the objective of assuming 
direct security responsibilities.  The exercise would enable KDF to widen its scope of 
development to tackle the threats looming over Kosovo but with significant resource 
constraints.  As the Figure 1 data from Global Militarization Index point out, Kosovo is the 
least militarized country in the region and would not pose a threat to regional stability.  The 
ultimate goal under this scenario is to develop a force big enough to tackle existing risks and 
be deployable in international operations but small enough so as not to overburden Kosovo 
budget.  
The Scenario 3 is the preferred course of action for a number of local actors.  Vetevendosje 
Movement and War Veterans have been strong advocates of this option.   This outcome is 
seen as by these actors both as a culmination of Kosovo’s statehood but also a necessary 
symbolic move to strengthen Kosovo sovereignty.  Proponents of this policy option argue 
that there is no reason to lessen Kosovo’s ambitions for as long its security is challenged by 
Serbia. Furthermore, despite the changes in the nature of threats and integration into NATO, 
nearly all states have sought ways how to advance their capabilities rather than downgrade 
their status or operations.   
Kosovo Security Force enjoys some of the highest favourability and satisfaction levels 
among the population.  The vast majority were in favour of KSF transforming into an army 
(Kosovo Security Barometer, 2012).   However, many international actors have doubts 
about the suitability of Scenario 2 and especially Scenario 3.   Despite the expiry of the 
provisional legal constraints imposed under the Ahtisaari Plan, a number of international 
actors told the research team that the move towards unilateral transformation could also 
jeopardize EU efforts to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Additionally, these 
untimely steps could also challenge Kosovo internal stability – local Serbian population and 
especially those living in northern Kosovo could see it as a step to extend Kosovo’s 
institutions’ authority in the areas through the use of force.  
 
5.3 Economic implications  
This section should try to 
summarize the resources required 
to sustain each policy option, 
should clearly list the costs of each 
scenario and measure it against 
existing and prospective economic 
growth and public budget. It 
should also list potential 
international support that each 
option can garner and the types of 
actions that are required.  
Kosovo, under the existing 
Scenario 1 has low numbers of 
active military personnel 
compared to regional counterparts 
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including Slovenia as a member of NATO and EU.  The data are based on international 
assessments of the numbers of active military personnel per 1000 people in a given country 
(IISS, 2010).  The data for Kosovo were generated on the basis of the latest Census Report 
and the numbers of KSF members at the given time. Slight modifications might have 
occurred due to on-going reforms in other regional countries and budget cuts but the figures 
represent a rough representation of the current situation.  With all things remaining the 
same, an increase in the number of military personnel as in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 would 
modestly improve the situation albeit would still remain well below the regional average.  
Kosovo military expenditures compared to other states in the region 
 
Source:  International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010) 
Kosovo’s 2013 military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic products (GDP) is 
0.7% (Scenario 1). This level of military expenditure is significantly lower compared to 
other countries in the region (SIPRI, 2013).  Serbia tops the list of regional countries in 
terms of military expenditure with 2.3% of GDP, followed by Macedonia (1, 7%) and 
Slovenia (1, 6%). Only Albania has a comparable percentage of military expenditure with 
0.8% of GDP.   Under the Scenario 2 Kosovo’s military expenditure would increase to 1.1%.  
The percentage of military expenditure under Scenario 3 would be 1.6% somewhat closer to 
Slovenia’s average in the past five years.  Military expenditures have been calculated on the 
basis of actual spending for Scenario 1 while Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 also account for 
personnel increases and capital investments that may results due to a revised mission 
statement.  
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Scenario 1 is affordable and sustainable in the medium and long-term. The second scenario 
involves a significant increase in defence spending as of 2015 – starting with nearly 63 
Million Euro and gradually increasing to 75 Million Euro by 2020.  The gradual increase of 
spending under this scenario is based on the assumption that the tax base will widen in view 
of rather optimistic GDP growth projections over the next six years.  An increase in military 
spending will necessarily involve some trade-offs – there will be less resources for 
investment in other important public policy sectors.  The implementation of Scenario 2 
programme requires external budgetary support – often available to countries that are part 
of the NATO PfP programmes.   
The Scenario 3 is costly.  It may well cross the point where losses outweigh security gains. 
This is particularly relevant at this given period when other social policy challenges 
dominate the public policy agenda. Although the political justification of much of the growth 
of military spending is usually based on the need to maintain national security, these recent 
dynamics have led to renewed debate over whether the increase of the military expenditure 
enhances or deteriorates economic growth and welfare. These trade-offs are particularly 
salient for Kosovo which faces severe economic problems and under-investment in other 
public policy domains as health, education and social policy.   Decisions about the preferred 
course of action should be rational and carefully planned against the backdrop of immediate 
social challenges.  
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 Kosovo should set-up a responsive security policy which accounts for the changes in 
the strategic environment, the in the internal dynamics as the ever increasing scope 
of non-traditional threats.  
 International and local security institutions should carefully consider the changing 
dynamics of threats resulting from Kosovo exposure to international economic, 
technological and environmental setting. 
 Kosovo security policy should incorporate a combined blend of defence, foreign 
policy, economic and cultural aspects. 
 NATO and major international stakeholders should gradually lead the process of 
transformation of Kosovo Security Force into a Kosovo Defence Force which is 
mandated with responsibilities for security, civil protection and contribution to 
international peace and stability.  
 The future Kosovo Defence Force should be trained and capable to perform diverse 
tasks and responsibilities.  The force should be capable of rapid reaction and 
deployment and should be trained and resourced to sustain the challenges of 
contemporary security environment.  
 Kosovo should prepare to increase military expenditure to accommodate the need 
for an additional 1000 active troops, better training and equipment.  
 The future Kosovo force should be able and willing to enter into regional 
cooperation initiatives and increase bilateral cooperation with recognising NATO 
members.  
 The legal amendments should explicitly highlight the defence nature of the force  
 The dynamics of implementation and timeframe should account for internal 
stability concerns and important EU initiatives to improve regional relations.  
 Kosovo political actors should seek to maintain and further nurture the 
partnerships with NATO and avoid any unilateral steps that may jeopardize future 
membership into the Alliance. 
